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Square Pegs, Round Hole: The Fourth Amendment
and Preflight Searches of Airline Passengers
in a Post-9/11 World
I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001 marked a day of tragedy on which
thousands of people lost their lives. As a result, the dangers of
hijacking became a heightened subject of concern for America. The
detection and detention of would-be hijackers is now a greater
priority than in prior times, and the government has implemented
many new measures—such as increased security at airports—to
accomplish this goal.1 However, these increased security measures,2
1. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began requiring airline carriers to
conduct screenings of all passengers and inspections of all carry-on items beginning in 1973.
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.6(a), at 280–81 (2004). Security measures
in airports increased beginning with the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) enacted
by Congress on November 19, 2001 as a response to the tragic events of 9/11. Id. at 281–82.
Therein, Congress federalized the inspection process and created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), charging it with responsibility for “security in all modes of
transportation,” including airlines and other modes. Id. at 282; 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(d) (West
2004). In an attempt to detect previously permitted objects like the small knives and box
cutters carried on board and used as weapons by the 9/11 hijackers, the ATSA set forth new,
“considerably more intrusive and intensive [screening procedures] than those earlier mandated
by the FAA.” 5 LAFAVE, supra, at 281–82 (citing Andrew Hessick, The Federalization of
Airport Security: Privacy Implications, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 43, 43 (2002)). These procedures
included examination of checked baggage for explosives through the use of dog sniffs, bombscan machines, and manual searches; closer inspection of passengers; and possible searches of
carry-on bags at boarding gates, all in addition to searches performed at the primary security
checkpoint. Id. at 282 (citing Hessick, supra, at 52; Brett Andrew Skean, Comment, The
Fourth Amendment and the New Face of Terrorism: How September 11th Could Change the Way
America Flies, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 567, 585 (2002)).
2. Additional security procedures or technologies currently used in preflight searches or
that foreseeably may be used include biological/chemical detectors, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
OUR SECURITY STRATEGY 1 (2006), http://www.tsa.gov/approach/layered_strategy.shtm;
trace portals or “puffers,” which expel strong puffs of air onto passengers’ bodies in order to
dislodge and then analyze trace particles for explosives contents, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., supra,
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/puffers.shtm;
biometrics,
including
fingerprint
identification and retinal scans, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., supra, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/
tech/biometrics.shtm; millimeter wave and X-ray backscatter technologies, which would
enable inspections officials to see through passengers’ clothing to detect weapons, see Marilyn
Adams, Most Flyers Accept Intrusion in the Name of Security, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2006-09-06-accepting-intrusions_x.htm;
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often in the form of precautionary, suspicionless searches made
without warrants, lead to a hard question regarding personal privacy
and the right to travel. Are these preflight passenger searches
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment?3
This Comment shows that a new Fourth Amendment approach
is necessary to justify warrantless preflight searches of passengers
boarding airliners because the prevailing approach is based on the
misapplication of a set of exceptions to the Warrant Clause in the
Fourth Amendment.4 Part II outlines how the history culminating in
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment shows the need for judicial
review of government search decisions and that a warrant-preference
standard should be applied in determining which searches and
seizures are constitutional under the Amendment. Part III discusses
how courts have misapplied exceptions to the warrant requirement—
including the stop-and-frisk exception, the consent exception, the
Katz privacy balancing test, and the border search exception—in
attempts to justify preflight passenger searches, and explains why
these attempts ultimately fail. Part IV calls for the creation of a sui
generis exception to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment
that resolves the irrationality and inconsistency in the courts’ current
justification of the searches. In addition to creating a rational
justification for the searches, this approach would allow security in
airline travel while being narrowly tailored to ensure that searches
necessary to public safety are not misapplied to other situations in
conflict with individual constitutional rights.

Jonathan Duffy, The Future of Airport Security, BBC NEWS ONLINE, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/magazine/3263343.stm (last visited October 18, 2006); and thermal imaging, see id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
4. Other commentators have also concluded that the presently existing exceptions to
the warrant requirement do not justify preflight or mass transit searches. See generally The
Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128 (1973) [hereinafter Airport
Searches]; Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches: Which Exception to the Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of Mass Transit Passengers To
Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231 (2006).
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The Fourth Amendment and Preflight Searches
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The language of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is
inherently ambiguous.5 While the Amendment specifically forbids
“unreasonable searches and seizures,”6 it outlines parameters for
proper search warrants but does not specifically describe when such
warrants are required. As a result, some authorities have argued that
a warrant-preference standard is not required by the Fourth
Amendment and that only a general reasonableness standard is
required to determine the constitutionality of searches and seizures.7
However, this Part will outline how the history culminating in the
Fourth Amendment demonstrates the importance of judicial review
of searches by law enforcement officials—and consequently a
warrant-preference standard—in the Amendment.

5. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.1(a), at 8 (“The Fourth Amendment, it has been aptly
noted, has ‘both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.’ It does not define the critical
word ‘unreasonable,’ nor does it indicate what the relationship is between that part prohibiting
unreasonable searches and that part setting forth the conditions under which warrants may
issue.” (citations omitted) (quoting J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 42 (1966))).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Although the general reasonableness standard has gained increasing acceptance,
Professor Thomas Y. Davies argues that while neither the reasonableness nor the warrantpreference construction “adheres to the historical meaning” of the clause, “the warrantpreference construction is more faithful to the Framers’ concerns than the generalizedreasonableness construction. In fact, the latter is nearly the antithesis of the Framers’
understanding.” Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 550 (1999). Either way, “the Supreme Court has not cleared the deck of many of
its rulings from the earlier era.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
191–92 (2002). Thus, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence today reflects both the “warrant
requirement and exceptions” paradigm and the reasonableness paradigm, leading to rulings
such as those concerning preflight searches, which often feature the reasoning of and tension
between both paradigms. See, e.g., Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980) (analyzing
preflight search under three rationales: expectation of privacy, consent, and general
reasonableness).
This Comment does not propose a complete discussion on this topic. For a greater
discussion on the tension been the general reasonableness construction and the warrantpreference construction, see generally DRESSLER, supra, at 183–92; Davies, supra. For the
argument that a warrant-preference standard is required by the Fourth Amendment, see, for
example, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1492–98 (1985); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure
for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994). For the
opposing view, see, for example, Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994); Bradley, supra, at 1481–91.
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In many ways, the Fourth Amendment is one of the most vague
provisions in the Bill of Rights. The phrasing of the Fourth
Amendment creates problems with its practical application because
the Amendment does not give guidelines to determine which
searches and seizures must be made pursuant to a warrant.8 The
problem comes, in part, because the “warrant” clause of the
Amendment is not directly tied to the “reasonable” clause. While the
Fourth Amendment begins by stating, “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”9 and ends
by stating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,”10 it
never directly states that a warrant is a requirement for a reasonable
governmental search and seizure.11 Thus, because the Fourth
Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures”12 and
does not technically preclude “reasonable” searches made without a
warrant,13 some scholars and judges have proposed that the
constitutionality of searches and seizures should be determined
according to a general “reasonableness” standard.14
However, such an approach is short-sighted in light of the
purpose and history of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment,
like the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, is
inherently tied to its history, and this history has been very important
to the Supreme Court when interpreting the Amendment.
Commenting on the Framers’ intentions when they penned the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Chimel v. California
stated, “The [Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to the

8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.1(a), at 8 & n.22.
12. Id.
13. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“[W]hat the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
14. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Amar, supra note 7, at 801–11; Bradley, supra note 7, at 1471.
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general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the
colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence.”15
The Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States specifically
acknowledged the importance of the history leading to the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment.16 The Court noted that in colonial times,
it was the practice of the British to employ writs of assistance in their
efforts to enforce taxation in their colonies.17 Writs enabled a
revenue officer, acting solely within his discretion, to search for
smuggled goods in suspected places.18 In February, 1761, in Boston,
James Otis spoke out against this practice, calling it “the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty
and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an
English law-book” because it put “the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.”19 Otis made his speech in Boston in
February 1761, during a famous political debate that was perhaps the
most effective event in creating support for the Revolutionary War.20
John Adams later commented on Otis’s speech: “Then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of
Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.”21
In light of the Fourth Amendment’s history, it is small wonder
that the Amendment includes stipulations against “unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.”22
In
addition
to
prohibiting
unreasonableness, the Fourth Amendment has long been read to
presume that reasonable searches be made pursuant to warrants,23
“supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”24 The

15. 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (citations omitted). For a greater discussion on the
history culminating in the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see generally Davies, supra 7,
at 547.
16. 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 303 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868)).
20. Id. at 625.
21. Id. (citations omitted).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Bradley, supra note 7, at
1492–98; Maclin, supra note 7, at 20–21.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire summarized the
foundation for this warrant-preference standard when it stated,
“[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specially established and welldelineated exceptions.’”25 These exceptions are “jealously and
carefully drawn,”26 and require “a showing by those who seek
exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative.”27
The Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Examples of such
exceptions include searches made on United States borders,28 stopand-frisk searches by police officers,29 searches made incident to
arrest,30 searches based on probable cause made in “hot pursuit” or
exigent circumstances,31 “special needs” searches,32 sobriety
checkpoint stops,33 administrative searches,34 and searches made with
valid consent.35 In addition, a warrantless search may be reasonable
where the court determines an individual either does not have an
actual or subjective expectation of privacy or that an individual’s
subjective expectation of privacy is not one society is willing to
accept as reasonable.36
25. 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
26. Id. at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
27. Id. (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
28. E.g., United States. v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
29. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
30. E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
31. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
32. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720 (plurality opinion) (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
33. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
34. E.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387
U.S. 523, 531–32, 538 (1967).
35. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558–60 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–
49 (1973).
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that in the
context of work-related intrusions and “investigations of work-related misconduct[,]”
government interests in proper and efficient workplace operations outweigh government
employees’ privacy interests in their place of work); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26
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In review, the practical application of the language of the Fourth
Amendment is not inherently clear because the Amendment does
not explicitly designate warrantless searches as unreasonable. An
approach that would reduce the Fourth Amendment to a
reasonableness balancing test is short-sighted because the history of
the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was adopted
to prevent the government discretion that such a balancing approach
would permit. However, the Supreme Court has allowed for the
creation of carefully reasoned exceptions to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.
III. HOW EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT CLAUSE IN THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT HAVE BEEN MISAPPLIED IN ATTEMPTS
TO INCLUDE PREFLIGHT PASSENGER SEARCHES
While United States courts have sought to justify preflight
searches of passengers under the Fourth Amendment since the early
1970s,37 the courts have never reached a single, unified justification
for preflight passenger searches.38 However, United States courts
have attempted to apply certain widely accepted exceptions to the
Warrant Clause in misguided attempts to justify preflight passenger
searches.
Courts have used four widely accepted exceptions to the Warrant
Clause in the Fourth Amendment to justify preflight passenger
searches: the Terry stop-and-frisk exception, the consent exception,

(1984) (holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their individual
cells).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 754 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
38. See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 111 (2006) (then-Judge Alito, writing for the Third Circuit, acknowledged that “courts
have not settled on a single framework for analyzing warrantless searches at airport
checkpoints”).
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the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy exception, and the border
search exception.39 This Part will explain how these four exceptions

39. In addition to the four exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment
that will be discussed below, some may attempt to analogize other recognized, but less
applicable, exceptions (e.g. searches made incident to arrest, searches based on probable cause
when in exigent circumstances, sobriety checkpoint stops, administrative searches, and “special
needs” searches). These analogies are either facially improper or are based upon “exceptions”
to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment which are really tacit applications of a general
reasonableness standard that is incompatible with the Amendment’s warrant preference.
Searches made incident to arrest cannot be logically analogized to preflight
passenger searches because in almost every preflight passenger search, no probable cause to
arrest the passenger exists prior to the search. The “incident to arrest” exception requires, of
course, probable cause to arrest. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) (“It is
sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully
effectuated the arrest and placed the petitioner in custody.”).
Searches based on probable cause made in “hot pursuit” or exigent circumstances
cannot be logically analogized because in almost every preflight passenger search, no probable
cause exists to suggest that a passenger possesses contraband materials prior to the search. In
addition, truly exigent circumstances do not exist because officers are not in “hot pursuit” of
the airline passengers they are searching. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297–99 (1967)
(holding a warrantless search of a house constitutional due to the “exigencies of the situation”
and stating that “[s]peed . . . was essential” because the officers had probable cause to believe
the suspect had committed an armed robbery and then entered the house less than five
minutes before the search was made (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948))).
Sobriety checkpoint stops cannot be logically analogized to preflight passenger
searches because while sobriety checkpoints involve suspicionless stopping, questioning, and
observing motorists, actual searches are likely to be permitted only upon individualized
suspicion. See Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450–51, 455 (1990) (holding
that a suspicionless initial stop of motorists at a sobriety checkpoint and “the associated
preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers” does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, but “[d]etention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing
may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard” (citation omitted)); cf. City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34–42 (2000) (striking down program utilizing
warrantless, suspicionless vehicle stops because the primary purpose of the program (drug
interdiction) was insufficient to be excepted from “the general rule that a seizure must be
accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion”).
Some might argue that preflight passenger searches are justified under the
administrative search exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the
Supreme Court of the United States has, in dicta, spoken approvingly of preflight searches,
justifying them under the administrative search doctrine. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674–75 (1989) (citing three preflight passenger search cases as
“[a]pplying our precedents dealing with administrative searches”). The Court also spoke
approvingly of preflight passenger searches in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)
(“[W]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports
and at entrances to courts and other official buildings.” (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674–76
& n.3)). See also Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 177–81; United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612,
615–18 (9th Cir. 2005) (using administrative search balancing tests to justify preflight
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came to be, how the courts have attempted to expand them so that
they apply to preflight passenger searches, and why these attempts
ultimately fail.
A. The Terry Stop-and-Frisk Search Exception
1. Terry v. Ohio
Terry v. Ohio lays out one set of circumstances in which a
warrantless search of a person by a police officer may be reasonable.40
In Terry, the defendant was convicted of illegally carrying a
concealed weapon.41 Over Terry’s objection, the government
presented as evidence at trial a handgun seized from Terry by a
police officer.42 The officer testified in a pretrial hearing that after he
observed Terry behaving suspiciously, the officer believed that Terry
might have been armed and was preparing to commit a crime.43 The
officer then approached Terry, identified himself as a police officer,
and asked Terry for his name.44 When Terry was not completely
responsive, the officer grabbed him, spun him around, and patted
down his outer clothing, finding the handgun.45 The trial court
passenger searches). As stated in note 38, the Court has yet to adopt a unified rationale for the
preflight searches, leading to opinions like Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980), which
reflect the uncertainty in this part of the law.
However, administrative (and “special needs”) searches cannot be logically
analogized to preflight passenger searches because administrative and “special needs” searches
are effectively general reasonableness standards in the guise of “exceptions” to the Warrant
Clause in the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (holding that certain
suspicionless administrative searches must only be “reasonable” in order to be constitutional,
with “reasonableness” being determined by a balancing test in which “the [government’s]
need to search [is weighed] against the invasion which the search entails”). For a greater
discussion on this topic, see generally Gerald S. Reamey, When “Special Needs” Meet Probable
Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1992); Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special Needs” and the Fourth
Amendment: An Exception Poised To Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997). As discussed above, the history culminating in the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates the importance of applying a warrant-preference standard—not a
general reasonableness standard—to the Fourth Amendment.
40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 4–5.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. at 6–7.
45. Id. at 7.
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upheld the search and seizure, holding that the officer’s experience
and observations led to a belief that Terry was armed, and that in
order to protect himself, the officer reasonably “stopped” Terry and
“frisked” his outer clothing for weapons.46
The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, holding
that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
that the seized handgun was properly introduced as evidence.47 The
Court concluded that “in most instances failure to comply with the
warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances.”48 The Court reasoned that even “a limited search of
outer clothing” might constitute “a severe, though brief, intrusion
on cherished personal security.”49
In light of this background, the Supreme Court in Terry held
that a search by a law enforcement official for weapons without
probable cause for arrest is constitutional provided it is “strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation” and is
limited to what is necessary to discover weapons that may harm the
police officer or others nearby.50 The Court reasoned that in order to
determine the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure, it is
necessary to balance the governmental interest or need of the search
or seizure against the invasion entailed by the search or seizure.51 In
justifying a particular intrusion, a police officer must “point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts”52 and “in light of [the officer’s]
experience,”53 would warrant that intrusion.54 In addition, the facts
must be judged by an objective “reasonable man” standard;55
“simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not
enough’”56 because weight must not be given to an “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”57
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

1640
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Thus, the Court in Terry held that a police officer having
reasonable suspicion “to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual” may, without a warrant, search that individual
for weapons.58 The officer must base his suspicion upon “specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience” and not an “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch.’”59
2. The Terry stop-and-frisk exception applied to preflight passenger
searches
One way courts have attempted to justify preflight passenger
searches is by comparing the search of a metal detector to the Terry
stop-and-frisk exception to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth
Amendment.60 In United States v. Epperson, the defendant was
convicted of violating a federal statute because he was carrying a
concealed weapon while trying to board an airplane.61 A United
States Marshal found the weapon after Epperson passed through a
magnetometer and the magnetometer gave an abnormally high
reading.62 Epperson moved to exclude the gun as evidence in trial,
arguing that the magnetometer scan was a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment and that the search was unreasonable because it
was made without a warrant and did not fall under one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.63
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
the magnetometer scan to be a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment,64 but held that the warrantless search was reasonable
and did not violate Epperson’s Fourth Amendment rights.65 The
court concluded that while the reason for which the warrant
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see also United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,
906 n.32 (9th Cir. 1973) (collecting airport search cases and stating that “[m]ost . . . have
relied upon Terry’s stop-and-frisk rationale or general ‘reasonableness’ to uphold searches
(including magnetometer scanning) of either the prospective passenger’s person or his carry-on
luggage” (citations omitted)).
61. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 772.
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requirement was dispensed in the search of Epperson was not the
same as the reason in the Terry case,66 the magnetometer search was
justified because it fell under the same recognized exception to the
warrant clause as a Terry stop-and-frisk search.67 The court noted
that “[t]he rationale of Terry is not limited to protection of the
investigating officer, but extends to ‘others . . . in danger,’”68 and
reasoned that the minimal invasion of Epperson’s personal privacy by
a magnetometer was reasonable and fully justifiable in light of the
government’s interest in discovering weapons and avoiding air
piracy.69
3. Why the Terry stop-and-frisk exception fails to justify preflight
passenger searches
Even though the Supreme Court’s rationale in Terry might at
first seem to apply to preflight passenger searches in that “[t]he
rationale of Terry is not limited to protection of the investigating
officer, but extends to ‘others . . . in danger,”70 the court in Epperson
improperly compared a preflight magnetometer search to a Terry
stop-and-frisk search. While the court did acknowledge that “the
reason in Terry for dispensing with the ordinary warrant requirement
is not the same as here,”71 the court should have also acknowledged
that because the reasoning behind preflight magnetometer searches
and Terry stop-and-frisk searches is different, the Terry stop-and-frisk
exception to Fourth Amendment searches cannot, of itself, justify
preflight magnetometer searches.
In Terry, even though the police officer did not have probable
cause to stop and frisk Terry,72 he did observe Terry’s actions for
some time73 and, based on these observations, had formed a
reasonable suspicion that Terry might endanger the officer or
others.74 Thus, the Terry exception is ultimately justified by both the
need for the safety of police officers and others in danger and the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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defendant’s observed actions that led to the officer’s reasonable
suspicion. In Epperson, however, the United States Marshal could
not have observed Epperson’s actions for any significant length of
time before Epperson approached the magnetometer,75 and could
not have found in Epperson’s individual actions a reasonable
suspicion that Epperson might endanger the Marshal or others.76
Thus, even though the magnetometer searches might indeed be
conducted to protect the safety of United States Marshals and the
general public, they cannot qualify under the Terry exception in the
Fourth Amendment because the individuals searched do not always
demonstrate observable actions that would lead to reasonable
suspicion.77
This is true even though at least one court has interpreted the
78
language in Terry more broadly. In United States v. Lopez, the
district court for the Eastern District of New York interpreted Terry
to instruct as follows:
A reviewing court must: (1) determine the objective evidence then
available to the law enforcement officer and (2) decide what level of
probability existed that the individual was armed and about to
engage in dangerous conduct; it must then rule whether that level
of probability justified the ‘frisk’ in light of (3) the manner in
which the frisk was conducted as bearing on the resentment it
might justifiably arouse in the person frisked (assuming he is not
about to engage in criminal conduct) and the community and (4)
the risk to the officer and the community of not disarming the
79
individual at once.

This reading of Terry might suggest that Terry simply sets forth a
test balancing the risk to the officer and the community against the
level of intrusion of a proposed search. Applying this balancing test,
if hijacking is assumed to be an extremely large risk to the public and
if airport security searches (such as those provided by metal
detectors) are considered to be minimally intrusive, then a preflight
passenger search could be justified under Terry even if there is no
individualized suspicion.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
See id.
See id. at 771.
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id.
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However, such an interpretation of Terry is overly broad in light
of the Supreme Court’s conscientiously fact-bound holding in Terry:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
80
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

Additionally, at least one other court has disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit’s application of the Terry exception in Epperson to
preflight passenger searches. The Ninth Circuit has stated that
preflight passenger searches are not justified under the Terry stopand-frisk exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth
Amendment.81 In United States v. Davis, Davis was convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon while attempting to board an airplane.82
An airline employee discovered the weapon in Davis’s briefcase while
performing a routine, suspicionless search of the carry-on luggage of
passengers boarding the aircraft.83 The court, while reversing and
remanding the conviction on other grounds,84 stated that routine,
suspicionless preflight passenger searches present a wholly different
problem than Terry searches.85 The court quoted language from the
Supreme Court reasoning that in a Terry stop-and-frisk search,
[t]he police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person
whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before
he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he
must have constitutionally adequate[,] reasonable grounds for
doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he

80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (emphasis added).
81. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Terry does not
justify the wholesale ‘frisking’ of the general public in order to locate weapons and prevent
future crimes.”).
82. Id. at 895.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 915.
85. Id. at 906.
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must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably
inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.86

Therefore, the court held that the Terry decision was inapplicable to
the case at hand because the airline employee making the search had
no individual suspicion of Davis.87
In sum, Terry searches fail to justify preflight passenger searches
because the Terry search was created with the limited purpose of
protecting police officers who reasonably and objectively suspected
that an individual was about to act illegally in a manner that would
endanger the officers or others nearby. Some courts have attempted
to apply Terry searches to preflight passenger searches, but this
analysis fails because preflight passenger searches are almost always
made without reasonable and individualized suspicion, an essential
requirement of Terry searches. In addition, this misapplied Terry
exception conflicts with individual constitutional rights by setting a
precedent in which the government can not only make warrantless
searches without probable cause, but can also make warrantless
searches without reasonable or individualized suspicion.
B. The Consent Exception
1. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte outlined the
consent exception: voluntary consent to a Fourth Amendment search
or seizure can make a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.88 In
Schneckloth, Bustamonte was charged with the possession of a check
with the intent to defraud.89 A police officer pulled over a car in
which Bustamonte and five others were riding for a minor traffic
violation.90 Because the driver did not have a driver’s license and
because only one of the six men had identification, the officer asked

86. Id. at 906 n.35 (citation omitted) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64
(1968)).
87. Id. at 907 (“[The airline employee] had no individualized basis for the search at all,
much less specific and articulable facts that would justify a reasonably prudent man in believing
that [Davis] was about to commit a crime or that he was carrying a weapon.”).
88. 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
89. Id. at 220.
90. Id.
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the men to exit the car.91 The officer asked one of Bustamonte’s
companions, whose brother owned the car, if the officer could search
the car.92 Bustamonte’s companion agreed and even helped the
officer search the car’s trunk.93 The officer found three checks, which
had been stolen from a car wash, wadded up under the back seat.94
At trial, Bustamonte moved to have the evidence suppressed,
asserting that it was acquired through a search and seizure that
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.95
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth began its discussion by
affirming that searches conducted pursuant to valid consent are
constitutionally permissible, with the government bearing the
burden to prove that the consent was “freely and voluntarily
given.”96 The consent must be made free of coercion, “[f]or, no
matter how subtly the coercion [is] applied, the resulting ‘consent’
would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion
against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.”97 However, the
Court reasoned that even though the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments limit the circumstances under which the government
may conduct a search, a person’s voluntary allowance of a search is
not constitutionally suspect.98 The Court indicated that the question
of whether consent to a search is voluntary or is the product of
express or implied coercion or duress is a question of fact that is
determined by the totality of the circumstances.99 In addition, the
Court asserted that even though “knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor” to be considered, the government does not
need to establish this knowledge as an indispensable element of
effective consent.100

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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2. The consent exception applied to preflight passenger searches
The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the consent exception
to a preflight passenger search.101 In Shapiro v. State, the defendant
was convicted for possession of cocaine.102 The cocaine was
discovered by a detective after Shapiro’s suitcase went through an xray machine at an airport.103 Shapiro moved to exclude the cocaine as
evidence at trial, arguing that the government acquired the cocaine
by a search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
because the detective lacked sufficient probable cause when he
searched Shapiro’s suitcase.104
The court held that in light of the totality of the circumstances,
Shapiro voluntarily consented to the search of his suitcase,105
reasoning that one exception to the probable cause requirement in
the Fourth Amendment is a search that is conducted pursuant to
free, unconstrained, and voluntary consent.106 Citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, the court acknowledged that “while knowledge of the
right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken into account, the
government need not establish such knowledge as an indispensable
requisite to effective consent.”107 The court found that Shapiro
voluntarily consented to having his suitcase searched because he
knew that he was required to submit to a security search upon
entering the airport’s boarding area.108 In addition, the court found
that Shapiro knew that he was not required to go through the
security checkpoint, board the airplane, or carry his suitcase onto the
plane.109 Because Shapiro chose to go through the security
checkpoint, board the airplane, and carry his suitcase onto the plane,
he consented to the search of himself and his baggage.110

101. Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980).
102. Id. at 346.
103. Id. at 347.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 348.
106. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Norman v. State, 379
So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)).
107. Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241–42).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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3. Why the consent exception fails to justify preflight passenger searches
The consent exception in the Fourth Amendment fails to justify
preflight passenger searches because consent, particularly “implied”
consent in the preflight search context, really just forces a person to
choose between his or her Fourth Amendment rights and his or her
constitutional right to travel.111 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit discussed this issue in United States v. Kroll.112
In Kroll, the defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance.113 For some unstated reason, Kroll, while attempting to
board an airplane, met the profile of a hijacker.114 As a result, a
United States Marshal conducted a search of Kroll's attaché.115 This
search resulted in the discovery of a small amount of amphetamine
and a partially consumed marijuana cigarette, which was found in an
ordinary white business envelope.116
Kroll moved to exclude the evidence at an evidentiary hearing;
the government objected, arguing that the warrantless search was
reasonable in part because Kroll consented to the search.117 The
district court granted Kroll’s motion to suppress the evidence,
holding that although it was reasonable to search Kroll’s attaché case
for weapons and explosives,118 the envelope’s contents were not
reasonably inspected.119 The district court reasoned that while “as a
general proposition . . . an inspection search of an airline passenger’s
carry-on luggage for the limited purpose of protecting lives and
property from weapons and explosives is not unreasonable at its
inception[,] . . . [t]his must not be interpreted, however, as license
for the wholesale exploration of a passenger’s luggage and its
contents.”120
111. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in the
text of the Constitution. Yet the ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is
firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.” (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966))); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1868).
112. 481 F.2d 884 (1973).
113. Id. at 885.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 885–86.
117. Id. at 886.
118. United States v. Kroll (Kroll I), 351 F. Supp. 148, 152 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff’d,
481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
119. United States v. Kroll (Kroll II), 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973).
120. Kroll I, 351 F. Supp. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
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In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed that the government had the burden of proving that
“consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”121 The
government attempted to prove Kroll’s consent by noting the
warnings which were posted to advise passengers at the airport that
they were subject to a search prior to boarding an aircraft.122 The
government argued that “[w]here a person is clearly warned in
advance that he will be searched and he still has time to withdraw as
[Kroll] did here, his conduct in seeking to board the plane must be
inferred to include a free, voluntary and intelligent consent to be
searched.”123 The circuit court disagreed, and, upholding the district
court’s ruling to suppress the evidence, found that Kroll’s actions did
not constitute consent “in any meaningful sense.”124 The court
reasoned that “[c]ompelling [Kroll] to choose between exercising
Fourth Amendment rights and his right to travel constitutes
coercion; the government cannot be said to have established that
[Kroll] freely and voluntarily consent[ed] to the search when to do
otherwise would have meant foregoing the constitutional right to
travel.”125 The court found unpersuasive the argument that Kroll
would not have been actually deprived of his travel rights because
alternative means to travel were available.126 The court reasoned that
“in many situations, flying may be the only practical means of
transportation.”127
In sum, the consent exception in the Fourth Amendment was
originally created for situations in which the person searched
knowingly and voluntarily consents to the search by a distinct
affirmative or implied action. At least one court has attempted to
apply the consent exception to preflight passenger searches, but this
analysis fails because persons subjected to preflight passenger
searches do not truly consent through an affirmative or implied
action, but are forced to consent in order to access their

121. Kroll II, 481 F.2d at 886 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 886 n.2.
127. Id. (quoting Patrick W. McGinley & Stephen F. Downs, Airport Searches and
Seizures—A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 322 (1972)).

1649

MINERT.MRO.DOC

2/15/2007 5:27:04 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2006

constitutional right to travel.128 In addition, this misapplied consent
exception conflicts with individual constitutional rights by creating a
precedent in which the government may use consent as a pretext for
an unreasonable warrantless search or seizure in which no voluntary
consent is truly given.
C. The Katz “Expectation of Privacy” Exception
1. Katz v. United States
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States outlined how an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy affects Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures.129 In Katz, the defendant was
convicted of transmitting gambling information by telephone in
violation of a federal statute.130 Over Katz’s objection, the
government was permitted to introduce evidence of his phone
conversations at trial.131 The government gained the evidence from
FBI agents who overheard Katz’s telephone conversations on a
public pay phone by attaching an electronic listening device to the
outside of the phone booth.132 The appellate court affirmed the
conviction, holding that the surveillance did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the agents did not physically enter the phone
booth.133
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the
government violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment rights through an
illegal search and seizure.134 However, the Court refused to decide if
a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area, finding:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what

128. Cf. Airport Searches, supra note 4, at 152 (“The Supreme Court has held, in other
contexts, that the exercise of one constitutional right may not be conditioned on the waiver of
another.” (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972))).
129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
130. Id. at 348.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 349 (quoting Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966)).
134. Id. at 359.
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he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.135

The Court further held that Katz justifiably expected privacy while
using the phone booth, so the government’s eavesdropping
comprised a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.136
The Court reasoned that the fact that the listening device did not
penetrate the phone booth’s wall was not constitutionally significant
because the Fourth Amendment extends to the recording of verbal
statements, even if they are overheard without a technical trespass.137
Finally, Justice Harlan introduced a privacy test in his
concurrence which is still referenced today.138 According to Justice
Harlan’s reading of prior Supreme Court decisions, “there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”139
Justice Harlan used a person’s home as an example of a place where
an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but
stated that objects, statements, or activities a person exposes in plain
view of others are not protected by a reasonable expectation of
privacy.140

135. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 353.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33
(2001) (“As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes
as reasonable. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment
search does not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned—
unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’”
(citations omitted)); United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, as articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence, was
adopted by a majority of the Court a little over a decade later.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979))); State v. Gonzalez, 898 A.2d 149, 155 & n.11 (Conn. 2006)
(“Although the term ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ originated in Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States . . . , it has since gained widespread acceptance in
both state and federal jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)).
139. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
140. Id.
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2. The Katz privacy test applied to preflight passenger searches
The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the Katz privacy test
to preflight passenger searches.141 In Shapiro v. State, discussed
above, the Florida Supreme Court upheld Shapiro’s conviction for
possession of cocaine.142 As an alternative143 to its rationale that
Shapiro had consented to the preflight search, the court stated that
for Shapiro to demonstrate that his Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated, he would need to show that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy and that society recognized that expectation as
reasonable.144 The court held that Shapiro failed to show that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy because his own testimony
showed that he had boarded planes many times and that he knew
that his carry-on luggage must be inspected at a designated
checkpoint in every airport.145 Additionally, the court held that even
if Shapiro had an expectation of privacy, society would not recognize
that expectation as reasonable.146 The court reasoned that “[a]t this
point in time when airplane hijacking is at a crisis level, such an
expectation, to be free from the limited intrusion brought about by
the screening process utilized in the boarding area of the airports, is
not justifiable under the circumstances.”147 The court further
reasoned that a person who enters an airport boarding area is given
notice by signs posted in boarding areas and should know that he or
she is subject to a search for weapons or other materials that could
be used to hijack an airplane.148
3. Why the Katz privacy test fails to justify preflight passenger searches
The Katz privacy test—in which the court is forced to determine
whether an individual has an expectation of privacy and whether
141. Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980).
142. Id. at 346.
143. The Shapiro court offered three rationales that purportedly justified the search: that
the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his carry-on baggage, id. at 347–48;
that the defendant consented to the search, id. at 348; and that the government’s interest in
searching the defendant’s suitcase justified the “minimal” intrusion under a general
reasonableness approach, id. at 348–50.
144. Id. at 347 (additional citations omitted) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. 347).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 347–48.
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society deems that “reasonable”149—fails to justify preflight passenger
searches because, as Justice Harlan himself later stated in United
States v. White, “[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in
large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and
values of the past and present.”150 Thus, an individual’s expectation
of privacy might not be “individual” or “subjective” at all—it might
be an expectation forced upon him or her or shaped by the
government through the passage of laws.151
A prime example of this is the Supreme Court of Florida’s
decision in Shapiro.152 The court held that Shapiro did not exhibit an
expectation of privacy because “he was aware that there is a
checkpoint at every airport where carry-on baggage must be
submitted for inspection.”153 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Davis provides another example.154 The court stated that,
“as a matter of constitutional law, a prospective passenger has a
choice: he may submit to a search of his person and immediate
possessions as a condition to boarding; or he may turn around and
leave.”155 Neither of these decisions leaves room for any kind of
individual subjective expectation, but rather projects the
government’s demand for diminished privacy in certain contexts
onto the individual.
In addition, the Katz privacy test has fallen out of favor with at
least a few courts because it does not adequately represent Fourth
Amendment protections.156 The Supreme Court in Smith v.
149. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
150. 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971).
151. As one scholar stated, under the Katz expectation test, “the government could
diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on
television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 384 (1974).
152. 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980).
153. Id. at 347.
154. 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 905 n.30 (“Justice Harlan’s first condition would not appear to be
universally applicable. The traditional protection afforded to the home under the Fourth
Amendment could not be denied to a particular homeowner because he mistakenly supposed
that government agents might enter whenever they pleased.”). In addition, the Supreme Court
has concluded that the second prong of the Katz test (that the expectation of privacy be one
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable) is much more important than the first (that
there is an actual subjective expectation of privacy). See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
525 n.7 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (stating that the Fourth
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Maryland lists an example where the two-part Katz privacy test
might fall short of Fourth Amendment standards: “For example, if
the government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television
that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual
expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.”157
Such a situation would be improper because the warrantless entry of
personal homes without probable cause violates the very protection
of privacy premised by the Fourth Amendment.158 Concerning
preflight passenger searches, under the reasoning of Smith v.
Maryland, the Ninth Circuit in Davis also inadequately represented
Fourth Amendment protections when it held that passengers have
the constitutional choice to either submit to searches or leave.159
In sum, the Katz privacy test was originally created in light of
the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s
reasonable expectations of privacy.160 At least one court has
attempted to expand the Katz privacy test by improperly applying it
to preflight passenger searches, but this analysis fails because the
court denies the possibility that an individual might have a
subjective, individual expectation of privacy at an airport and instead
projects onto that individual an expectation of privacy that has been
created through government practice.161 In addition, the improper
application and expansion of the Katz privacy test conflicts with
individual constitutional rights by creating a precedent in which the
government can justify unreasonable warrantless searches and
seizures by simply declaring that, in certain circumstances, a searched
individual does not have an expectation of privacy.

Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those
“expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
157. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
159. Davis, 482 F.2d at 913.
160. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
161. Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980).
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D. The Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment

1. United States v. Ramsey
The Supreme Court in United States v. Ramsey outlined the
longstanding right of the United States to protect itself by carrying
out border searches.162 In Ramsey, the defendants were convicted of
narcotics offenses.163 After customs officials gained “reasonable cause
to suspect” a violation of certain customs statutes, they opened and
inspected, without a search warrant, incoming international mail
meant for the defendants and discovered narcotics.164 Against the
defendants’ objection, the government admitted the narcotics as
evidence at trial, and the defendants were found guilty.165
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the
customs officer’s warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.166 The Court commented that it should not require an
extended demonstration to show that “searches made at the border,
pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself
by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country, are reasonable . . . .”167 The Court reasoned that the same
Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment also enacted the
first customs statute, which gave customs officers “full power and
authority” to search vessels which they suspected were concealing
goods subject to duties.168 The court distinguished this “plenary
customs power” from searches of “any particular dwelling-house,
store, building, or other place” where a search warrant based upon
probable cause was required.169 The Court further reasoned that,
even before the Fourth Amendment was adopted, border searches
have been considered reasonable and have never needed the
additional requirement of reasonableness or the existence of

162.
163.
(1977).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
Stat. 29).
169.

431 U.S. 606 (1977).
United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d, 431 U.S. 606
431 U.S. at 607, 610.
See id. at 610–11.
Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 616.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1
Id. (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29).
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probable cause to be constitutional because of the sole fact that the
individual or article in question has entered the country from the
outside.170 “This longstanding recognition that searches at our
borders without probable cause and without a warrant are
nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth
Amendment itself.”171
2. The border search exception applied to preflight passenger searches
In United States v. Nates, the Ninth Circuit expressly held that the
border search exception, which generally is applied only to searches of
persons entering the United States, also applies to persons exiting the
United States.172 In that case, Nates was convicted of attempting to
smuggle over $100,000 onto an international flight departing for
Colombia in violation of a currency reporting law.173 While making a
general baggage search, a United States customs agent selected two
of Nates’s bags for inspection to determine if Nates was attempting
to take large amounts of unreported currency from the country.174
The agent “selected Nates’ two bags for inspection because they
were new (one still b[ore] a price tag), had no passenger name tag,
and were unusually heavy.”175 Nates moved to suppress the evidence
procured by the search, and argued on appeal that it was acquired by
an unconstitutional search.176
In determining the constitutionality of the currency reporting
law, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting, “The border
search exception to the fourth amendment, which allows a search to
be initiated without a warrant, probable cause or articulable
suspicion, applies to exit searches.”177 The court noted that the rule
applying the border search exception to a search of a person exiting a

170. Id. at 619.
171. Id.
172. 831 F.2d 860, 862 (1987). For further discussion of the so-called “reverse” border
exception, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 451–52 (7th ed. West 2004) (citing United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791 (5th
Cir. 1991); Nates, 831 F.2d at 863 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); United States v. Duncan, 693
F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1982)).
173. Nates, 831 F.2d at 861.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 862 (citations ommitted).
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United States border has been criticized, but not overruled.178
However, the court then specifically stated, “This circuit holds that a
suspicionless exit border search is constitutional.”179 Based upon this
analysis, the Ninth Circuit determined that the currency reporting
law, requiring reasonable cause for suspicion, was constitutional.180
In United States v. Skipwith, the Fifth Circuit has held that
passengers presenting themselves to board airliners can be searched
according to border search standards—“mere or unsupported
suspicion.”181 In that case, Skipwith was convicted of drug possession
after a preflight passenger search revealed he was carrying cocaine.182
A deputy United States marshal made a warrantless search of
Skipwith because he matched the Federal Aviation Administration
anti-skyjack profile, claimed not to have identification, appeared to
be very nervous, and may have been under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.183 Skipwith moved to suppress the evidence procured by the
search at trial, arguing it was acquired by an unconstitutional
search.184
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting that, in light of the
widespread publicity of the government’s efforts to avoid aircraft
piracy, Skipwith should have known he was subject to a preflight
search once he attempted to board a plane.185 The court also noted,
“Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or
otherwise, does not in itself make all non-probable-cause searches
reasonable.”186 To calculate the reasonableness of preflight passenger
searches, the court outlined three factors to be considered: “public
necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion.”187 The
court determined, “Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of
the relevant factors, is that the standards for initiating a search of a
person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those
178. Id. (citing United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 983–94 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting); United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 503–04 (9th Cir. 1984),
vacated in part, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (1973).
182. Id. at 1273.
183. Id. at 1273–74.
184. Id. at 1273.
185. Id. at 1273–74.
186. Id. at 1275.
187. Id.
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applied in border crossing situations.”188 The court held that “those
who actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier, like
those seeking entrance into the country, are subject to a search based
on mere or unsupported suspicion.”189 The court also stated that
reasonableness does not limit officers to searching only passengers
who match a certain profile or who appear nervous or suspicious.190
3. Why the border search exception fails to justify preflight passenger
searches
In light of the holdings in Nates191 and Skipwith,192 the
temptation naturally appears to apply the border search exception to
preflight passenger searches of all departing flights—both
international and domestic. While it is not disputed that the border
search exception in the Fourth Amendment applies to passengers of
international flights entering the United States, the border search
exception cannot be rationally stretched to justify all preflight
passenger searches conducted at airports. The border search
exception applies to arriving international flights because the airports
at which international flights arrive become “‘functional
equivalent[s]’ of the border.”193 Thus, searches of an arriving
international traveler are reasonable because it can be shown by more
than just probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the traveler
crossed a United States border.194 However, the vast majority of
flights departing or arriving in United States airports do not cross
international borders. Consequently, the border search exception in
the Fourth Amendment cannot apply to purely domestic flights.
Even more than the sovereign right of the United States to
protect itself,195 the essence of the “border search” exception is “the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into [the

188. Id. at 1276.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 831 F.2d 860, 862 (1987).
192. 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (1973).
193. See United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 525–26 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that an airport may act as the
“functional equivalent of the border”).
194. See Niver, 689 F.2d at 526.
195. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
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United States] from outside.”196 Thus, while the border search
exception may be justified at a border or its functional equivalent by
this “single fact” alone,197 the exception cannot apply when a border
crossing into this country is not reasonably certain.198 In United
States v. Ramsey, discussed above, the United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue. The Court reasoned as follows:
Travellers [sic] may be . . . stopped [without a warrant and without
suspicion] in crossing an international boundary because of
national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those
lawfully within the country . . . have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official
authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.199

In sum, the border search exception in the Fourth Amendment
was originally created because of the right of the United States, as a
sovereign nation, to protect itself by searching those that seek to
enter its borders. Some courts have analogized the border search
exception to preflight passenger searches occurring at airports that
act as functional equivalents to borders,200 but the border search
exception cannot be expanded to justify preflight searches of
passengers embarking on purely domestic flights. Such an improper
application of the border search exception would conflict with
individual constitutional rights by creating a precedent in which the
government may conduct a warrantless search or seizure for reasons
inconsistent with those originally justifying the border search
exception.
In review, United States courts have expanded four “traditional”
exceptions to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment by
unnaturally applying them to preflight passenger searches. These
misapplied exceptions include the Terry stop-and-frisk exception,201
196. Id. at 619.
197. Id.
198. See Niver, 689 F.2d at 526.
199. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925)).
200. See United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1982); Niver, 689 F.2d
at 525–26.
201. See supra Part III.A.
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the consent exception,202 the Katz expectation of privacy
exception,203 and the border search exception.204 However, the
application of any of these four exceptions to preflight searches is
ultimately not justified. Preflight searches do not qualify as Terry
stop-and-frisk searches because they are usually made without
individualized suspicion; the searches cannot be authorized by
consent because the air traveler has no realistic choice but to submit;
the searches do not fall under the Katz privacy test because the
government should not tell its citizens what their reasonable
expectation of privacy should be (a problem with the Katz test
generally); and the searches do not qualify under the border
exception because most preflight passenger searches are not made at
any United States border or functional equivalent. Additionally,
misapplied exceptions in the Fourth Amendment conflict with
individual constitutional rights by creating precedents in which the
government may make unreasonable warrantless searches and
seizures.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFYING
PREFLIGHT PASSENGER SEARCHES UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As this Comment shows, preflight searches cannot be logically
justified under the current exceptions to the Warrant Clause in the
Fourth Amendment. Consequently, this Part calls upon the Supreme
Court to create a sui generis exception to the warrant requirement in
the Fourth Amendment in order to constitutionally justify preflight
passenger searches.
Even though warrantless preflight passenger searches do not
neatly fit into any of the long-established and accepted categories of
warrantless searches considered reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
most people would likely believe it undesirable to allow all airline
passengers to forego security screening.205 Chief Judge Friendly, in
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. See supra Part III.C.
204. See supra Part III.D.
205. See, e.g., Marilyn Adams, Most Flyers Accept Intrusion in the Name of Security, USA
TODAY, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2006-09-06-accepting
-intrusions_x.htm (reporting Gallup Poll data that 70% of those polled “say none of the
security measures used in airports should be stopped”).
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his concurring remarks in United States v. Bell, stated, “When the
risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large
airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness.”206
However, general public awareness and approval of preflight
passenger searches do not, of themselves, provide legal justification
for the searches. As Justice Powell of the Supreme Court reminded
us in United States v. United States District Court, “[g]iven the
difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of
abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent.”207
Consequently, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a
208
preflight passenger search case and create a sui generis exception
to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment, based upon the
longstanding need to create greater rationality and unity in this area
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.209 This exception would only
apply to mass transportation systems accessible to the public, where
security screening for weapons is necessary because the danger of
terrorism is abnormally great.
The Supreme Court should consider the inherent physical
characteristics of public mass transportation when crafting the
boundaries of this new exception. Identifying these characteristics
will assist the Court in determining which forms of mass
transportation accessible to the public should be covered by the
proposed exception.210 In addition, specifically tying the physical
characteristics of public mass transportation systems to the
parameters of the exception will make the exception less likely to be
misapplied in non-mass transportation situations. Currently, airlines,
passenger trains, subways, buses, and possibly automobile taxis are
the principal forms of mass public transportation employed in the
United States.
206. 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
207. 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
208. The uncertainty in this area of the law remains timely, as evidenced by the recent
case of United States v. Hartwell. 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 111
(2006); see supra note 38. The Court had the opportunity to resolve the unsettled law in
preflight passenger searches by granting certiorari, but declined to do so.
209. See Amar, supra note 7, at 758 (describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as “a
vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but
often perverse”).
210. The Court would, of course, be well-advised to consider data gathered by experts in
making these determinations in order to best create a narrowly tailored exception.
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One inherent characteristic of some forms of public mass
transportation is a substantial likelihood of considerable loss of
human life in the event of a terrorist attack. Factors such as the
passenger carrying capacity of each type of public mass transportation
vehicle, the speeds available to and maneuverability of the vehicle,
and the capacity of the vehicle itself to be used as weapon will be
important in determining the potential loss of human life in a
terrorist attack.211
A second inherent characteristic of mass transportation systems
available to the public concerns the degree of difficulty the
government would encounter in an attempt to stop a hijacking
before the transportation vehicle is utilized as a terrorist weapon.
The question becomes, at exactly what point is the last clear chance
to prevent the destruction of life and property that would result from
a terrorist attack carried out on a particular form of transportation?212
When the last clear chance to avoid such destruction occurs prior to
the departure of the public transportation vehicle, the difficulty in
stopping a terrorist attack occurring after departure may be so great
as to become a practical impossibility.213 Thus, in modes of
transportation where the last clear chance to prevent mass
211. In formulating the exception, it may be useful to the Court to consider the number
of lives lost as a result of the most historically destructive terrorist attacks involving particular
forms of transportation. See, e.g., U.S. Deaths in Iraq, War on Terror Surpass 9/11 Toll,
CNN.com, Sept. 3 2006, http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/03/death
.toll/ (stating the 9/11 toll as 2973, “including Americans and foreign nationals but excluding
the terrorists”); Associated Press, Madrid Bomb Death Toll Lowered to 190, MSNBC.com, Mar.
23, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4502950/ (190 deaths reported from March 11,
2004 bombing of commuter train in Madrid).
212. In tort law, society has recognized the significance of a party’s last clear chance to
prevent damage to life and property. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897–98 (8th ed. 2004).
213. Reflecting the practical difficulty a government would experience in an attempt to
halt hijacked aircraft, some nations, such as Poland and Germany, have passed statutes
permitting the military to shoot down hijacked aircraft as a last resort. BBC NEWS, Poland To
Down Hijacked Aircraft, Jan. 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4172487.stm;
see also United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Little can be done to
balk the malefactor after [weapons or explosives are] successfully smuggled aboard.” (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir.1973))). In contrast,
law enforcement officials have been able to stop hijacked busses on several occasions. See, e.g.,
Richard Cowen & Justo Bautista, Police Arrest 7 in Jitney Hijacking, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), Nov. 3, 2006, at L.01 (hijacked jitney bus stopped after police vehicle blocked
its path); Man Arrested After 70-Mile Bus Hijacking in San Diego, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1997,
at 17 (hijacked bus rolled to stop soon after running over spike-strip laid by police). But see Bus
Hijacker Killed After Chase Covers 320 Miles of Desert, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at A15
(spikes set by police cause several flat tires on hijacked bus but fail to stop bus).
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destruction to life and property occurs prior to the departure of the
vehicle, warrantless searches of boarding passengers would be more
justified than in modes of transportation where an attack
commenced after the departure of the vehicle would be more easily
thwarted.
A third inherent characteristic of public mass transportation
concerns the substantial likelihood that a terrorist attack will have a
crippling effect on the public mass transit system and associated
public infrastructure. Depending upon the type of transportation
vehicle involved in the terrorist attack and the extent of potential
damage to property, widespread paralyzation of certain public mass
transportation systems may occur.214
However, the Supreme Court should consider more than just the
inherent physical characteristics of public mass transportation when
crafting the boundaries of this new exception—the Court should
consider further guidelines to ensure the exception is at least
somewhat resistant to misapplication. That is, the Court should
strive to create an exception that is narrowly tailored to prevent it
from being applied in situations where such a search would not be
justified.
One guideline that would facilitate the narrow tailoring of the
exception is that it should be applicable, by its terms, to a specific
and limited factual context. The factual situation covered by the
exception should involve only that where passengers present
themselves to board certain mass transportation systems available to
the public that are especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The
exception should be further tailored to a specific purpose—which, in
this case, would be to search for items that potentially can be used to
carry out a terrorist attack.
A second guideline that would facilitate the narrow tailoring of
the proposed exception is that the searches authorized by it would
214. See WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, JR., COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ONE
YEAR LATER, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF 9/11 ON NEW YORK CITY 2 (2002), available at
http://comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/reports/impact-9-11-year-later.pdf (estimating, as
a result of the 9/11 attacks, a $4.3 billion loss in infrastructure—including trains, telephone
service, and electricity—to New York City); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 292, 326 (2004), available at
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (noting the closing of subway
stations and major thoroughfares on 9/11 and that “[f]or the first time in history, all
nonemergency civilian aircraft in the United States were grounded, stranding tens of thousands
of passengers across the country”).
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be permitted to be only as intrusive as necessary to attain the
government’s stated purpose (detecting terrorist weapons).215 The
exception should also take into account advances in technology, such
that the intrusive nature of the search may decrease or increase
depending on advances in technology by terrorists and/or the
government.216
A third guideline that will facilitate the narrow tailoring of the
proposed exception is that the new exception should fit as seamlessly
as possible within current search and seizure practice and
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment. In making this
assessment, the Court should give deference, as it did in Ramsey, to
searches that have been a longstanding historical practice.217 An
exception that does not dramatically alter the status quo is preferable
because it will not disturb other, possibly long-upheld, legal
principles.
Presently, applying the above guidelines would seem to dictate
that the proposed sui generis exception should be confined to
preflight passenger searches at airports. Indeed, preflight passenger
searches have existed for decades. Additionally, if limited to preflight
passenger searches for objects potentially used to carry out a terrorist
attack, the proposed exception would also comport with the
guideline that the proposed exception be narrowly tailored. Thus,
the exception would ensure that searches necessary to public safety
are not applied to situations where they are not justified.
Concluding that the proposed exception would apply only to
preflight passenger searches also comports with accepted societal
practice, as expressed by Justice Souter in United States v. Drayton:

215. The requirement that searches and stops be tailored to their stated purpose is not
foreign to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427
(2004) (police automobile checkpoint stop “appropriately tailored” to fit need to seek
information from public about “hit and run” that occurred about one week before); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified
by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” (citations omitted)).
216. See, e.g., Jon Hilkevitch, Airline is Adding to Cockpit Security, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1,
2004, at 13, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/chi-0409010159
sep01,1,6776422.story?coll=chi-techtopheds-hed (describing bulletproof, FAA-approved steel
barriers installed in United Airlines aircraft “that can be quickly fastened across front aisles of
planes to protect pilots from attacks when the cockpit door is opened during flight”).
217. See supra notes 162–71 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s deference to
the longstanding practice of border searches).
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Anyone who travels by air today submits to searches of the
person and luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft. It is
universally accepted that such intrusions are necessary to hedge
against risks that, nowadays, even small children understand. The
commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been
justified for ground transportation . . . and no such conditions have
been placed on passengers getting on trains or buses.218

However, while the proposed exception is narrowly tailored to
avoid misapplication, expressly incorporating the inherent
characteristics of public mass transportation into the exception allows
for the possibility that changes in technology or other circumstances
might qualify other forms of mass public transportation for the
exception outlined here. As other forms meet the proper
requirements, they naturally will bring themselves into the exception,
rather than forcing the exception to expand to include them. Thus,
the exception will have the safeguards of a narrowly tailored
construction while remaining open to the possibility of future
change.
Finally, justifying preflight passenger searches through the
creation of a sui generis exception would promote logical consistency
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Ideally, the Terry stop-andfrisk search will again only be applied to police officers who observe
suspicious activity, the consent exception will again only be applied
to truly voluntary actions, the Katz privacy analysis may again
determine the existence of privacy expectations rather than
projecting governmental expectations of privacy on the public, and
the border search exception will again only be applied at borders or
their true functional equivalents.
Most importantly, as exceptions in the Fourth Amendment
return to their rational foundations, the warrant requirement and
judicial review may be sustained in their proper role in the
Amendment. Ideally, Fourth Amendment interpretation will reach
the day when, in the words of James Madison, “independent
tribunals of justice . . . will be naturally led to resist every

218. 536 U.S. 194, 208 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). But see generally Keeley, supra
note 4 (considering which Fourth Amendment exception(s) may justify suspicionless searches
of passengers boarding subways).
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encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
Constitution . . . .”219
In review, the prevailing constitutional approach attempts to
misapply certain widely accepted exceptions to the warrant clause in
the Fourth Amendment in an effort to justify preflight searches of
passengers boarding airliners. A more effective and protective
constitutional approach would be to create a sui generis exception to
the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment which is narrowly
tailored to ensure that searches necessary to public safety are not
misapplied to other situations in conflict with individual
constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Individual constitutional rights make up the heart of liberty in
the United States. While the United States must support efforts to
detect and deter terrorism in this modern era, such efforts must not
be made at the expense of these liberties.
This Comment shows that the history culminating in the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates the importance of judicial review of
searches by law enforcement officials—and consequently a warrantpreference standard—in the Amendment. In light of this
requirement, courts have attempted to analogize accepted Fourth
Amendment exceptions to preflight passenger searches through the
Terry stop-and-frisk exception, the consent exception, the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy exception, and the border search
exception.220 However, this Comment also shows that these
unnatural applications are improper because they fail to provide a
logical constitutional foundation for preflight passenger searches.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should create a sui generis
exception to the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment that is
narrowly tailored to ensure that searches truly necessary to public
safety are not misapplied to other situations in which government
intrusion into personal security is not justified. Thus, all exceptions
to the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment, including the
proposed exception, would be made only in proper factual

219. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
220. See supra Part III.
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circumstances and would be conscientiously limited to provide the
least possible intrusion on individual constitutional rights.
Steven R. Minert
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